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Abstract 
This paper examines to what extent is Gambia sovereign from foreign intervention. It considers the legality or otherwise 
of ECOWAS‟ military intervention in the recent post-election/ political crisis in Gambia. Bearing in mind that national 
sovereignty in international law is not absolute as International Humanitarian Law, Human Right and International 
Criminal Law have provided exceptions, this paper highlight situations which permit foreign intervention in a state and 
considers the various argument of writers on the legality/illegality of ECOWAS‟ military intervention in Gambia. The 
paper argues that ECOWAS‟ military intervention lacks the requisite authorisation of the UN Security Council who by 
its resolution permitted the application of political measures only. ECOWAS also failed to meet the requirement for the 
application of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Gambia. More so, intervention on the basis of restoring democracy is 
void of legal backing as the enabling protocol permits ECOWAS to apply sanctions on member-state where democracy 
is abruptly brought to an end. On the whole, this paper concludes that though ECOWAS‟ military intervention is 
justifiable in view of the situation in Gambia, it however lacked the requisite legal backing. The paper recommends that 
in situations where intervention is not based on humanitarian reason to necessitate the application of R2P, military 
intervention should have the requisite authorisation of the UN Security Council and the application of force should be 
the last option having exhausted all other means of dispute resolution. 
Keywords: national sovereignty, non-intervention, Gambia, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
military intervention 
1. Introduction 
National sovereignty is an old phenomenon that is well grounded in international law. This concept is based on the 
assumption that international order can be achieved and maintained where states respect each other‟s sovereignty and 
adhere to the norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of one another. Respecting the sovereignty of each state 
forms a basis of global covenant which acts as a basis of the foundation of international order.1 
Having originated from the Peace of Westphalia 1648, a treaty which was drawn up to end the thirty years war in 
Europe,2 history has it that the Pope as well as political leaders of Western Europe were involved in this treaty that 
permitted the prestigious office of the Pope to be utilized in granting leaders of proto-nation states authority to exercise 
power within their national borders.3 
National sovereignty recognizes territorial borders, the monopoly of legitimate violence within these borders as well as 
the responsibility to provide security and basic condition of livelihood to citizens of the country.4 The concept of 
national sovereignty gained prominence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a result of global spread in Asia, 
Latin America, Africa and Middle East.5  
                                                        
1 Robert J. (2000).The Global Covenant: Conduct in the World of States (1st ed.) England: Old University Press. 30. 
2 Goodman L W. (1993). Democracy, Sovereignty and Intervention. 9 American University Law Review 27. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Appaduria A (2015, 16th December) Key Note Lecture on UN Conference on Refugees. Paper presented at UN 
Conference. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/5671644f54b.pdf 
5 Ibid. 
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With the awakening of national sovereignty, situations have arisen, where sovereign states under the guise of 
sovereignty perpetrate wrongs on its own people. Example of this is during World War II, where over six million Jews 
were murdered by Adolf Hitler in the Holocaust. The respect for the nation‟s sovereignty was a reason why other 
nations failed in preventing such atrocities against the German Jews.6 
However, with the birth of the United Nations and the adoption of its charter, covenants and other instruments, the 
notion of absolute sovereignty no longer hold sway. International Humanitarian Law, Human Right and International 
Criminal Law have set limits on absolute sovereignty of nations. 
Happenings around the world particularly in Africa reveal that some political leaders are yet to accept the fact that the 
right of their citizens is not at their mercy. International community and regional organisation would not hesitate to 
interfere in their supposed „national sovereignty‟ so as to protect the right of their citizens. However, the legality of such 
intervention becomes an important issue for consideration. The recent happening in Gambia during her December 2016 
election and ECOWAS‟ intervention have been queried especially as it relates to the legality. Issues arising from the 
legality/illegality of ECOWAS‟ intervention in the election are the main crux of this paper.  
This paper commences with this introduction. It afterwards clarifies some concept that relates to the paper. It further 
considers the legal framework for national sovereignty and non-intervention after which it highlight limitations to 
national sovereignty. Furthermore, it analyses critically the issue of ECOWAS‟ military intervention in Gambia noting 
various arguments on the matter. The paper finally concludes and makes recommendations.  
2. Conceptual Clarification and Legal Frameworks for Sovereignty and Non-Intervention 
Conceptual Clarification 
Sovereignty  
Steinberger in his definition of sovereignty considered it as a basic international legal status of a state that is not subject, 
within its territorial jurisdiction to the governmental, executive, legislative or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign state or to 
foreign law other than public international law.7  
Furthermore, Gevorgyan considers sovereignty to be an inalienable political and legal property of any state.8  
More so, Krilov considers sovereignty as the property and the state's ability to independently, without external 
interference, determine its internal and external policies, provided the respect for civil and human rights, protection of 
minority rights and respect for international law are observed.9 Noting the importance of Sovereignty Judge Huber 
stated in the case of Island of Palmas arbitration thus: 
“Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe to 
exercise therein, to the exclusion of any state, the functions of a state…The development of international law, have 
established this principle of the exclusive competence of the state in regard to its own territory in such a way as to make 
it the point of departure in settling most questions that concern international relations.10” 
In this paper sovereignty is defined as a legal expression which suggests national independence. It implies the power of 
a state over its citizen as well as the authority to enforce obedience to its laws and regulations. 
Principle of Non- Intervention 
This principle means restrain from exacting an act by use of force on another country which has equal sovereignty with 
others.11 It can also be viewed as restraining from act capable of denying or rupturing the idea of the principles of 
self-determination of a sovereign country.12 
                                                        
6 Canadian Human Right Commission “Human Right in Canada: An Historical Perspective, State Sovereignty v. 
International Law”. Retrieved from  
http://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/historical-perspective/en/browseSubjects/hitler.asp 
7 Steinberger H. (1987). Sovereignty, Encyclopaedia for Public International Law, (Vol. 10. p. 4140). 
8Gevorgyan K. “Concept of State Sovereignty: Modern Attitude” Retrieved from  
http://ysu.am/files/Karen_Gevorgyan.pdf 
9 Ibid. 
10 Island of Palmas Case (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 838. 
11 Nicaragua v. USA 1986 I.C.J 14. 
12 Ibid.  
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Kmacioglu13 noted that the principle of non-intervention logically complements the principle of sovereignty. 
In this paper, the principle of Non- intervention can be seen as a cardinal principle of contemporary international law, 
which is aimed at prohibiting not only armed intervention but all direct and indirect intervention in the domestic affairs 
of a sovereign state.  
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in its analysis of R2P sees it as a collective responsibility on the 
international community that is aimed at ensuring that the international community acts in the face of genocide, ethnic 
cleansings, war crimes and crimes against humanity.14 
Legal Frameworks Protecting National Sovereignty and Non -Intervention 
The legal frameworks protecting national sovereignty are codified in the United Nations (UN) Charter and some 
regional instruments.  
United Nations (UN) Charter  
The UN charter by the express provision of Article 2(4) guarantees the sovereignty of nation- state in that it prohibits all 
member states from using force or the threat of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state. 
For ease of reference the said article is reproduced thus: 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” 
Furthermore, by the import of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, the UN is restrained from intervening in matters that is 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state except for the application of enforcement measures under the 
charter. 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2131 (1965) regarding Declaration on admissibility of intervention 
in the Domestic Affairs of State and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty.
15
 
This is another legal frame work that seeks to protect national sovereignty. By this resolution, the General Assembly 
declared that no state has the right, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever to intervene in the internal or 
external affairs of any states.  
This resolution prohibits what so ever form of intervention be it armed intervention and all other forms of interference 
or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.16  
Furthermore, the resolution discourage state from using or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it, the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to 
secure advantages of any kind. It also prohibits a state from organizing, assisting, fomenting, inciting or tolerating 
subversive terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or 
interference in civil strife in another state.17 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970) 
18
 
This instrument provides a principle on friendly relations and co-operation among states. Apart from reaffirming the 
customary international law on non-intervention which imposes a duty on states to refrain in its international relations 
                                                        
13 Kmacioglu M (2005) The Principle of Non-Intervention at the United Nations: The Charter Frame Work and the 
Legal Debate. Retrieved from  
https://sam.gov.tr/the-principle-of-non-intervention-at-the-united-nations-the-charter-framework-and-the-legal-debate 
14 Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect (2015) The Responsibility to Protect: A background briefing. Retrieved 
from http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p-backgrounder.pdf 
 
15 General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 December 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of intervention in 
the Domestic Affairs of State and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty. Retrieved from 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_2131-xx/ga_2131-xx_e.pdf 
16 Resolution No. 1 General Assembly, 20th session, December 21, 1965. 
17 Ibid. Resolutions No. 2. 
18General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) on the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among states in accordance with the charter of the United Nations. Retrieved from 
http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm 
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from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of state, it also reaffirmed in 
accordance with the UN Charter the basic importance of sovereign equality noting that the purpose of UN can only be 
realised if states enjoy sovereign equality.19 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/172
20
  
This resolution provides for the respect of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states in 
their electoral processes. 
Charter of the Organisation of American State
21
 
This is a regional legal frame work that protects national sovereignty. By the express provision of article 15 & 16 which 
is to the effect that no state or group of states have the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, 
in the internal or external affairs of any other state. It went ahead to prohibit riot as well as other form of interference 
against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements. It further prohibits the use of 
force against the sovereign will of another state. 
Charter of League of Arab State
22
 
Article V of the Charter of the Arab League provides a legal backing for national sovereignty which is to the effect that 
any resort to force in order to resolve disputes between two or more member-states of the League is prohibited.  
This provision upholds the principle of non-intervention as well as the sovereignty of member states of the League. 
Charter of Organisation of African Unity
23 
Article III provides for member states‟ affirmation to adhere to the principle of sovereign equality of all member state, 
non-interference in the internal affairs of member states as well as respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
each state. 
Having seen these, it is important to state at this juncture that customary international law as well as case law has 
accorded recognition to national sovereignty.  
The decision of International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. USA re-iterates the position of the law of non-intervention 
where the court stated that: 
“The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside 
interference, though examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent; the court considers that it is part and 
parcel of Customary International Law.”24  
As relating to customary international law, the International Court of Justice in Corfu Channel Case25 noted that 
“between independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.”  
Limitation on National Sovereignty 
It is important to note that though national sovereignty is very vital in that over the years it has helped secure national 
borders of smaller countries from interference from larger and more developed countries, there are however limitations 
placed on national sovereignty.  
These factors have accounted for reasons why major world powers, international and regional organisations have 
intervened in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. The basis for most intervention in domestic affairs is on 
humanitarian purpose. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides a basis for most intervention which is acts that constitute 
                                                        
19Ibid. Preamble of General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV).  
20 General Assembly Resolution 50/172 on Respect for the Principle of national sovereignty and non-interference in the 
internal affairs in their Electoral Process. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/ares50-172.htm 
21 Charter of the Organisation of American State. Retrieved from  
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20119/volume-119-I-1609-English.pdf  
22 Charter of the League of Arab States. Retrieved from  
http://arableague.weebly.com/uploads/7/6/9/3/7693018/the_charter_of_the_arab_league.pdf 
23 Charter of Organisation of African Unity. Retrieved from http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/oau_charter.pdf 
24 Nicaragua v. USA (n 11).  
25 Corfu Channel (1949) (United Kingdom v. Albania) I.C.J. 1949 I.C.J 4. 22. Retrieved from  
http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/international-law/international-law-keyed-to-damrosche/chapter-4/corfu-channel-c
ase-united-kingdom-v-albania/ 
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threat to international peace and security. 
This part gives consideration to these factors. 
Gross Violation of Human Right  
This is the basis upon which the sovereignty of nation can be curtailed. This occurs in situations whereby the agents of 
the state engage in frequent violation of the fundamental human rights of its citizens.26  
Threat to Legitimate Order  
This particularly is a provision of the 2003 Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
(AU).27 In expanding the scope of AU, this protocol permits intervention in the domestic affairs of member state when 
there is threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability of member state.  
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
R2P was formulated and adopted in the 2005 World Submit Outcome Document at the UN World Summit. There 
member states unanimously accorded recognition to the responsibility to protect populations from war crimes, genocide, 
ethnic cleanings and crime against humanity. 28 In 2009, 2010 and 2011 through the UN Secretary-General‟s reports 
this principle was re-iterated and has gained popularity.29 The principle was employed by the United Nations Security 
Council in response to crises in Darfur, Cote d‟Ivoire, Central African Republic, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali, Syria 
and Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, and Guinea.30 
R2P imposes obligation on states to protect their citizens from mass atrocity crimes, and in situation where they 
manifestly fail in doing this, the international community collectively is obliged to act.31 
This is as a result of the prevalence of inter-state aggression that broke out in the 1990s within the borders of countries 
such as Somalia, Rwanda, and Former Yugoslavia where with, the concept of national sovereignty of these countries 
paralyzed the world over acting even when grave atrocities were meted out against the citizens of these countries.32  
Four types of mass atrocity crimes namely: genocide,33 ethnic cleanings,34 war crime35 and crimes against humanity36 
are viewed as extreme human right violation and R2P applies to these crimes.  
International community going by the principle of R2P must aid states prevent these mass atrocity crimes. This can be 
by rendering economic assistance, rule of law reform, building of inclusive political institutions or by mediating, where 
violence becomes imminent. 
It is important to note that it is only when mediation becomes unsuccessful in the resolution of dispute that the 
                                                        
26 Ayoob M (2002) Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty (2002) Vol 6: no 1 International Journal of  
Human Rights. Retrieved from  
http://kirstenjfisher.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Ayoob-Humanitarian-Intervention-and-State-Sovereignty.pdf  
27 Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Retrieved from 
https://www.lrct.go.tz/download/treaty-convention/amendments.pdf 
28 Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, (n 14). 
29 Ibid.  
30  Bellamy A J (2015) The Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect. Retrieved from 
http://www.cries.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/006-bellamy.pdf 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid . 
33 Genocide is an action taken with intent to destroy in part or whole, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. This 
is the subject of the 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide. 
34 This refers to forced removal or displacement of populations, whether through the means of physical expulsion or 
intimidation, killing, acts of terror, rape etc.  
35 War crime as listed by the International Criminal Court (ICC) are such acts including torture, hostage-taking, 
mistreating prisoners of war, targeting civilians, pillage, rape, and sexual slavery, and the intentional use of starvation.  
36 Crimes against humanity as listed by the ICC statue include extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, rape, 
extreme forms of discrimination and other inhumane acts of similar character intentionally causing suffering or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health. These acts when they are widespread and systematic, consciously 
committed as acts of policy amount to crimes against humanity. 
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international community acting through the UN Security Council can use coercive measure such as sanction, arms 
embargoes or threatening to refer the perpetrators to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Where the state is clearly 
unwilling or has failed to protect its population, then the Security Council may consider the use of force.37  
At this juncture, it is also important to note that R2P is not limited to the UN alone. From the adoption of R2P in 2005, 
the UN has emphasised the immense contribution regional and sub-regional organisations can make in the actualisation 
of the principle. In fact, the UN advocated for a partnership with regional organisations to be able to implement the R2P 
principle, especially considering that the UN Charter provides that regional organisations are also to contribute to 
international peace and security.38 
Having seen these, R2P has three pillars thus:39 
States have the primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity as well as from incitement of these crimes. 
International community have the responsibility to assist and encourage states to fulfill their responsibility to protect, 
particularly by helping them to address the underlying causes of genocide and mass atrocities, build the capacity to 
prevent these crimes, address problems before they escalate, and encourage them to fulfill their commitments. 
International community have the responsibility to take timely and decisive action to protect populations from the four 
crimes through diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means (principally in accordance with Chapters VI and 
VIII of the UN Charter) and, on a case-by-case basis, should peaceful means „prove inadequate‟ and national authorities 
are manifestly failing to protect their populations, other more forceful means through Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
can be applied. 
It is against this background that this paper consider the Gambian situation, in a bid to decipher whether Economic 
Community of West African States‟ ( ECOWAS) military intervention can comfortably be brought under the head of 
ECOWAS‟ responsibility to protect or whether it was a mere interference in Gambia‟s sovereignty.  
3. Gambian Post-Election Turmoil: On the Legality or otherwise of ECOWAS’ Military Intervention in Gambia  
This part considers the legality or otherwise of ECOWAS‟ intervention in Gambia, owing to the fact that one of the 
contentions of former President Yahya Jammeh was that, ECOWAS‟ military intervention in Gambia evaded and 
undermined Gambia‟s sovereignty. 
In a bid to analyze this issue, it will be important to consider the fact of the Gambian situation. 
On the 1st of December, 2016 Gambians went to polls to change the 22 years government of former President Yahya 
Jammeh which was repressive, authoritarian and tyrannical.40 Having come into power as a young military officer in 
1994 through a bloodless coup, he was elected in 1996, re-elected subsequently in 2001, 2006 and 2011 though in an 
election that did not accord to international standards of free and fair election.41 To express his desire to remain in 
power indefinitely, former president Yahya Jammeh in a widely quoted BBC interview stated that he would “rule this 
country for one billion years …, if Allah says so.” 42 
In the observation of Human Right Organisations, his regime was marred with high level of human right violations, 
torture, intimidation and disappearance of journalists and activist.43 Furthermore, his regime denied the registration of 
International Election Observers save for small African Union contingent as the December 2016 election approached. 
More so, there was no access to internet and text messages services on Election Day, due to the fact that his regime shut 
down all the services.44  
                                                        
37 Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, (n 14). 
38 See Chapter VIII of the UN Charter 
39World Summit Outcome Document (2005). Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf. Paragraphs 138-139 
40 Hartmann C (2017) ECOWAS and the Restoration of Peace in the Gambians 52 (1) African Spectrum. 85-99. 
http://www.africa-spectrum.org 
41 Perfect, David (2010). The Gambia under Yahya Jammeh: An Assessment. 99 The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs. 53–63 
42BBC News. (12 December 2011) Gambia‟s Yahya Jammeh Ready for Billion-Year. BBC News 
43 Amnesty International (2016) Opposition in Gambia. The Danger of Dissent. London: Amnesty International 
44 Hartmann C (n 40). 
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After the election, surprisingly on the 2nd of December, 2016 the opposition candidate Adama Barrow was declared the 
winner of the polls. In Jammeh‟s reaction to this he initially in his television speech conceded defeat and congratulated 
his opponent Adama Barrow on the success of the polls. He even went ahead to state that he would not contest the 
election, and vowed to return to his farm, and in his words, “to eat what I grow and grow what I eat”45 
The great jubilation of Gambians over the victory is indicative of the fact that they were tired of Jammeh‟s hard, 
iron-fisted regime. 
However, this jubilation and celebration was short-lived as on the 9th of December, 2016, precisely a week later in 
another television speech, Jammeh declared that he no longer had trust in the electoral process, as such he would be 
contesting the results declared by the Electoral Commission on the basis of some irregularities that were manifest. He 
therefore sought for a fresh election under a different electoral administration.46To signify his control over the security 
apparatus, on the 10th of December, he deployed troops on the streets of Banjul, which occupied the offices of the 
Electoral Commission and denied staff access to the building.47  
At the legal end of his term in office which was on the 18th of January, 2017, Jammeh refused to hand over power to the 
new democratically elected president. This raised both domestic and international condemnation, considering that the 
new president elect, fearing for his life fled the country and went into hiding in Senegal. However his absence from 
Gambia did not prevent international community from recognizing his legitimacy.48  
Under this atmosphere, ECOWAS had to take step to intervene and even prepared for a military invasion of the country. 
Following the inauguration of Adama Barrow as the new president at the embassy on the 19th of January in Dakar, some 
Senegalese troops having surrounded the country began to march towards Banjul in a bid to threaten Jammeh.  Finally 
Jammeh seeing the stern domestic and international action against his decision accepted to leave and went on exile on the 
21st of January, 2017 which as such led to Borrow‟s assumption of office at the capital city on the 26th of January, 2017.49 
Having seen this, there are divergent views on the legality/ illegality of ECOWAS‟ intervention in Gambia. While some 
writers applauded ECOWAS‟ timely intervention in Gambia, others view such action as illegal, not only invading 
Gambia‟s sovereignty but displaying a show of ego and power by this sub-regional organisation.  
To start with, Haatman while noting that Gambia is a member of ECOWAS from 1975 stated further that ECOWAS has 
the mandate to promote democracy and good governance and to adopt R2P as empowered by the revised ECOWAS 
treaty (1993),50 Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention (1999)51 and the Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance (2001).52 He noted further that though these instruments mandate ECOWAS to observe election in 
member countries, they were denied access in Gambia, as Jammeh refused to allow ECOWAS Observation team 
monitor the December 2016 presidential election.53 He noted also that when Jammeh initially conceded defeat, 
ECOWAS together with some AU and UN official representatives for West Africa congratulated the Gambian people 
for having a smooth and peaceful election. However, when later Jammeh changed his position, ECOWAS quickly 
reacted calling on the Gambian government to “abide by its constitutional responsibilities and international obligations.” 
More so, the government should respect fundamentally, the verdict of the ballots and ensure the security of the 
president elect, Adama Barrow as well as all Gambian citizens. ECOWAS‟ statement reveals that Jammeh‟s action not 
                                                        
45 Ibid  
46 Ibid. Note that on the 5th of December, 2017, the commission re-adjusted the votes counted and reduced the number 
of votes won by each of the three candidates but even thereafter still confirmed Adama Barrow‟s victor. 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Article 4, Paragraph J of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, 1993. Retrieved from 
http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Revised-treaty.pdf 
51 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, 
(1999) Retrieved from http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/hr_docs/african/docs/other/ecowas4.doc 
52 Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism 
For Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (2001). Retrieved from 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/350_ECOWAS%20Protocol%20on%20Democracy%20and%
20Good%20Governance.pdf 
53 Hartmann C (n 40).  
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only threatens the peace of Gambia, but the whole of the sub-region in its entity.54 ECOWAS‟ first line of action was 
mediation as a delegate was sent to Banjul on the 13th of December, 2016 but unfortunately the mediation proved 
abortive.55 Other attempt was made for mediation, this time around ECOWAS utilised the good offices of President 
Buhari and President Mahama of Nigeria and Ghana respectively, but this attempt also failed to make Jammeh change 
his mind. It was at the approach of the deadline which was 18 January 2017, that it became apparent that military 
intervention is inevitable,56 and consequently on the 14th of January, ECOWAS‟ Military Intervention in The Gambia 
(ECOMIG) was formed. On the 18th of January, 2017 troops (most from Senegal, with contingents from Nigeria, Ghana, 
Mali, and Togo) started to move towards the border of Gambia (which is surrounded by Senegalese territory), and 
together with Nigerian forces they implemented a naval blockade.57 
In a nutshell, Hartman posited that the action of ECOWAS is legitimate, having obtained not only the approval of the 
AU but the UN. The UN through the Security Council unanimously approved resolution 2337, expressing its full 
support for ECOWAS‟ quest “to ensure, by political means first,” that “the will of the people of Gambia expressed in 
the results of 1st December elections” is honoured. He however noted that the UN Security Council did not endorse 
military action according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.58 As such, the legal mandate it derived from the 
aforementioned instruments is a basis for the exercise of the power of intervention into the Gambian situation in a bid to 
restore democracy. 
In addition, another writer Jallow59 noted that Jammeh‟s total disregard for international organisations and states such 
as AU, ECOWAS, EU, US and UK was quite worrisome as in several occasions he insulted them. He also noted that his 
cruel, brutal and animalistic behaviour justifies such military intervention. He asserted that Jammeh‟s administration is 
tyrannical, extravagant, repulsive and tribalistic. In his words,  
“Yahya Jammeh is stuck to the past; in the world of archetypal dictators, tyrants and military rulers, who graduated into 
believing their indispensability and supreme right to not be accountable to justice and the laws of the lands.”60 
Having highlighted most atrocities and sufferings Gambians have suffered under his leadership, he concluded by stating 
that ECOWAS‟ intervention is needed as well as timely. 
In addition to these, an opinion expressed by Nkea61 on the legality of ECOWAS‟ action reveals that it must be 
measured in accordance to applicable rules of international law as it relates to the use of force between states. This he 
stated must be weighed against Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that prohibits the use of force and expressed the rule of 
non-intervention recognized customarily under international law. He however noted that military intervention that is 
aimed at restoring or upholding a democratically elected government is exclusion to this rule as ECOWAS 
pro-democratic intervention would rather support the territorial sovereignty of Gambia by enforcing the political will 
and sovereignty of Gambians which would otherwise be violated by the hold on power by Jammeh.62 
Having seen these, in a bid to have a fair standing on the legality or otherwise of the intervention, this paper gives 
consideration to opinion of writers who vehemently opposes ECOWAS‟ intervention on the basis that it undermined the 
sovereignty of Gambia.  
                                                        
54 Fiftieth Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Head of States and Government (2016). Retrieved from 
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Narmer 63in his thought raised vital proposition that this paper considers. To start with, he posited that ECOWAS‟ intervention 
was in a bid to back up Senegal‟s invasion of Gambia, which is Senegal‟s neighbour. He noted that this is a tectonic shift in the 
business of war that is gradually taking shape across the continent of Africa in general. Many of the West African states that 
demanded invasion by Senegal have experienced numerous military coups carried out by the military and have been involved 
in counter-insurgency operations yet there was no intervention from neighbouring states or even sub-regional organisation, so 
why is the Gambian situation so peculiar? In addition, it is his averment that ECOWAS itself lacks the mandate to intervene in 
any nation in the region for any reason save to ensure the protection of citizens in the case of humanitarian intervention crisis, 
which the Gambian situation in his opinion do not fit in. In addition, he averred that 86 per cent of Gambian‟s foreign trade is 
conducted with Britain and EU states, tourism as such constituting at least 40 per cent of Gambian‟s hard currency earning. As 
such, diplomatic pressure would be a better pragmatic tool against Jammeh considering the fact that farming and fishing 
constitute the source of earning of the people. Imperialist governments would have placed serious sanction on Jammeh 
without necessarily intervening in the affairs of the country.64  
He further analyzed a close connection between United States (U.S) and Senegal with Senegal‟s army representing a 
U.S military outpost in West Africa. In his view, Senegal should not be seen as a representative for ensuring or restoring 
democracy under ECOWAS tutelage. To him, the intervention is part of a neo-colonialist project to guarantee the 
dominance of Washington in regional military affairs. Jammeh was not the only African leader whose government was 
in power for so long, for instance Paul Biya, Cameroon‟s president has been in power for 33 years, while Djibouti‟s 
Ismail Omar Gaelleh and Uganda‟s Yoweri Museveni have been in power for more than a decade with no sign of 
stepping down.65 It is however questionable that ECOWAS did not intervene in these countries to unseat their 
presidents who have been in power for so long. He posited finally that most nations that backed Senegal‟s illegal 
invasion of Gambia have worst atrocities going on in their countries. For Instance, Nigeria has being battling with the 
menace of Boko Haram and the havoc they keep causing. The issue of finding Chibok Girls is still lingering, and 
instead of concentrating on these issues, the Buhari-led government is more concern in invading Gambia a nation which 
posed no threat to regional stability of West Africa.66 
Another position on the illegality of ECOWAS‟ intervention in Gambia is expressed in the opinion of Akpan.67 It is his 
averment that Jammeh‟s argument on the illegality of ECOWAS‟ planned action was the right position of the law. The 
basis for his averment is hinged on the fact that ECOWAS lacked the legal basis for such intervention, because the 
original or revised ECOWAS treaty did not empower ECOWAS to establish a standby military force or deploy such 
force against the territorial integrity of any member state. He noted further that on the contrary, article 4(d) of ECOWAS‟ 
treaty clearly commits member states to uphold the principle of non-aggression between states. More so, supporters of 
ECOWAS might want to use article 4 (j) of ECOWAS‟ treaty as the basis for authority in that such empowered it to 
“promote and consolidate a democratic system of governance in each member state as envisaged by the Declaration of 
political Principles adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1992” in the region. However, this article did not identify expressly any 
means of promoting and consolidating a democratic system of governance. In the failure of an express laid down rule, it 
means states cannot be bound by implied obligation in a treaty based on the rule of pacta sunt servanda.68  
Akpan made a comparison between ECOWAS‟ intervention in Sierra Leone and Liberia as against what was operational 
in Gambia. He noted that in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS had to intervene to put an end to the brutal civil war that was fast 
becoming a Hiroshima. That is, ECOWAS‟ intervention was based on humanitarian ground. In comparison to Gambia, 
this was not the situation, in fact, Jammeh was careful not to unleash soldiers on the citizenry. Finally, he noted that 
only African Union is empowered to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state on the basis of war crime, 
genocide and crime against humanity.69 
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Having considered the various opinions, this paper will start by noting that it is the Security Council of the United 
Nations that is armed with the function of maintaining international security and peace.70 By the provision of article 52 
(1) of the UN Charter, regional organisations or agencies are not precluded from dealing with matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security which must be in consonance to the purpose and principle of the UN 
Charter. However, by the import of article 53 regional organisations require the authorization of the Security Council to 
be able to carry out any enforcement action. 
The question that arises at this juncture is was ECOWAS authorised to intervene militarily in Gambia? To answer this, it 
is important to peruse Resolution 2337 on Peace Consolidation in West Africa passed by the UN Security Council on 
the 19th of January, 2017 to address the Gambian situation.71 The Security Council after reaffirming its strong 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Islamic Republic of Gambia recalled 
the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation. It further condemns the decision of 
Jammeh not to relinquish power and further welcomes AU and ECOWAS‟ decision to accord recognition to Adama 
Barrow as the president of Gambia as stated in the Fiftieth Ordinary Session of ECOWAS as well as the decisions of the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU). By the import of Paragraph 6 of Resolution 2337 of the Security 
Council, it expresses its full support to ECOWAS in its commitment to ensure “by political means first” the respect of 
the will of the people of Gambia as expressed in the results of 1st December elections.”  
From the wordings of this provision, can it be said that UN Security Council expressly authorized military intervention 
in Gambia? Juxtaposing this situation with a similar situation in Sierra Leone in 1998, whereby the Security Council 
approved ex post facto the decision to return Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to power, stating that the situation in Sierra Leone 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region and on that basis intervened on humanitarian basis. 
It expressly prevented the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, petroleum and petroleum products, arms and ammunition 
including other related weapons.72 Furthermore, in Haiti following the 1991 coup the Security Council also authorised 
“ all necessary measures” in order to assist, in cooperation with the Organization of American States, to bring solution 
to the crisis in Haiti,73 as such by another resolution, it authorised the use of multinational force in Haiti.74 
It is doubtful however, if Security Council authorised military invasion in Gambia. This is expressly seen in the 2017 
UN Resolution 2337 which only authorized the use of „political means first‟ in resolving the dispute in Gambia. As a 
matter of necessity, the Security Council should authorise the use of force, and this authority must precede the use of 
force itself. This position the ICJ echoed in Libya v UK75 while emphasizing the need for prior Security Council‟s 
resolution and authorisation of the use of force. The ICJ declined to give retroactive effect to a Security Council‟s 
resolution, which was a resolution adopted by the Security Council after the deployment of force noting that this cannot 
permit the use of force. The essence of this prior authorization is to secure the UN‟s collective security system and 
safeguard the Security Council while ensuring that it has effective control over non-defensive use of force and as such it 
follows that authorization must precede the action.76 This also ensures that the use of force is brought to the minimum 
and encourages conciliatory ways of resolving dispute as well as protecting the sovereignty of state against external 
interference into the affairs of the state.77 
Another issue that questions the legality is whether the Gambian situation resulted to threat to international peace and 
security to permit the use of force as provided by Chapter VII of the UN Charter? A comparison of the Gambian 
situation with what was obtainable in Haiti reveals a lot of differences in both situations. In Haiti the Security Council 
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interpreted the 1994 crisis as a threat to international peace and security. The 9 months de facto regime in Haiti was 
notorious for political and extra judicial killings by the security forces and their allies, disappearance of persons, 
politically motivated rapes, beatings and other mistreatment which called for humanitarian intervention.78  
At this juncture, it is vital to state that military intervention can be legitimate where it is a unilateral humanitarian 
intervention. In other words, a state or group of states can act without the express authorization of the UN to halt 
atrocities perpetrated in another state. An example of this is NATO‟s intervention in Kosovo in 1999. While it is obvious 
that the prior authorization of UN Security council was not first sought and obtained, some have argued that, the 
intervention is legitimate on moral or humanitarian ground.79 However, the Gambian situation cannot fit into this 
context because the situation has not ripened to call for intervention on humanitarian ground. 
Furthermore, the principle of R2P as discussed above requires international community to protect citizens from mass atrocities 
such as war crime, crime against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing, where a state has failed to protect its citizens from 
these crimes. However, the query here is, were there mass atrocities committed in Gambia to warrant ECOWAS‟ intervention? 
The answer is in the negative. Jammeh was not accused of war crime, crime against humanity, ethnic cleansings or genocide. 
Although there were prospects for commission of genocide in Gambia, for instance, in June 2016, the UN Special Adviser on 
the prevention of Genocide condemned Jammeh‟s inciting comments about the Mandinka ethnic group wherewith he 
threatened to eliminate them, and sees them as irresponsible and extremely dangerous.80  
Finally, this paper considers the legitimacy of ECOWAS‟ intervention against the background of restoring a legitimate order in 
Gambia. By the import of the 2003 Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU),81 the 
protocol expands the scope of AU‟s intervention in the territory of member state when there is threat to legitimate order to 
restore peace and stability to member state.82 Gambia signed this protocol, ratified/ acceded and deposited it.83 The situation 
in Gambia justifies AU‟s intervention considering that Jammeh‟s refusal to hand over power amounted to a threat to Gambia‟s 
legitimate order. There was need to restore peace to Gambia which was at the verge of breaking up, as it was reported that 
there was intense tension and thousands of Gambians were already fleeing the country to neighbouring villages and rural 
areas.84 Furthermore, as it relates to ECOWAS, the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance mandates ECOWAS 
to deal with domestic politics of member states. This protocol which has been ratified by most member states including 
Gambia requires every accession to power to be in accordance with a free, fair and transparent election reflecting the principle 
of zero tolerance for power obtained by unconstitutional means.85 ECOWAS by this protocol is empowered to implement 
sanctions in an event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means.86 These sanctions range from suspension of 
decision-making rights within ECOWAS to any other sanctions deemed appropriate by the Mediation and Security Council 
and the Authority of Heads of State and Government. From the wordings of this protocol, it is not stated that ECOWAS can 
intervene on the basis of democracy, but can only apply sanctions.  
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As such, from the foregoing it is clear that the only basis that justifies intervention in Gambia is on the basis of 
preventing a threat to legitimate order and from the enabling law, AU is the organisation vested with the responsibility 
of intervention on such basis.  
Having considered all these, this paper observes that in Africa, interventions till date have political undertone. Powerful 
states are always eager to intervene in the sovereignty of weaker states. This is glaring in Nigeria‟s role in ECOMOG In 
1990 when it intervened in Liberia, Sierra Leone in 1997 as well as Guinea- Bissau in 1999.The intervention in Gambia is 
politically inclined considering that Jammeh recently have not gained the acceptance of regional leaders, primarily not 
because of his repressive rule, but due to his unreliable personal behaviour. This is manifest in some statements made by 
him that is regarded demeaning. For instance, he not only claimed to have cured HIV successfully and different types of 
cancer with his herbal remedies, but noted also that homosexuals are “vermin” and also described non-religious people as 
“lower than pigs.” 87These statements reflect his personality which most sub-regional governments were not comfortable 
with. 
4. Conclusion and Recommendations 
While this paper commends ECOWAS‟ swift response to the Gambian situation, it however calls the legitimacy of its 
military intervention to question. The UN Security Council did not authorised the use of force, it only authorised 
intervention by political means. More so, the Gambian situation did not meet the threshold to allow intervention on 
humanitarian ground as none of the mass atrocities have been committed against its citizens to warrant application of 
R2P. In addition, intervening on the basis of upholding democracy and the rule of law is bereft of legal backing as the 
enabling protocol permits ECOWAS to impose sanction where democracy is or is about to be brought to an end. AU 
would have been the appropriate organisation to intervene on such ground as it has the mandate to intervene when there 
is a threat to legitimate order, peace and stability of member states.  
Bearing in mind that national sovereignty is vital to the existence of a nation, which International Law tries to protect, 
this paper recommends the following: 
1. The provision of an instrument which clearly state the basis for intervention to encompass situations like the 
Gambian case. 
2. The exhaustion of all other peaceful means of resolution before military intervention. In Gambia for instance, the 
window of peaceful resolution was still open. Instead of venturing on an illegal military intervention, ECOWAS would 
have sought the UN Security Council‟s declaration that Jammeh‟s refusal to cede power amounts to threat to 
international peace and security based on the provision of article 39 of the UN‟s charter. Having done that, ECOWAS 
can seek the authorisation of the Security Council to intervene on the basis of article 53 of the UN Charter.  
3. Intervention should be based on genuine suffering of citizens with no political undertone or factor. The 
intervention in Gambia have set a bad precedent, though justifiable but without legal backing.  
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